Relations with Neighboring Countries

Russia

After centuries of animosity, Russia has become the second-largest importer of Turkish goods after Germany. Turkey has invested over USD 10 billion into Russian construction projects. Moscow is Turkey’s primary energy supplier. It could become an important supplier of military hardware as well, providing Ankara with an alternative source to the West upon whom it has been reliant. The precedent was established in the mid 1990s, when Turkey became the first NATO country to purchase firearms and helicopters from

Russia. The transaction came about after Ankara was thwarted from making such purchases by Western governments, who were concerned that these goods would be used against Kurdish militants.

Armenia

Differing historical narratives have long divided Armenians and Turks; the events of 1915 are a major sticking point. The true number of victims of what is commonly referred to outside of Turkey as “genocide” is unknown. Most impartial estimates peg the number between 800,000 to as many as 1.5 million ethnic Armenian men, women and children sent to their deaths upon the orders of the ruling Ottoman government. The official Turkish position is that the casualties were simply the unfortunate victims of a chaotic civil war. Moreover, the government states only 300,000-600,000 Armenians perished, which is far fewer than Turkish victims of the war. While regrettable, Turkey believes the Armenians brought this upon themselves by collaborating with the Russians.

After Armenia gained independence in 1991, the creation of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, an unofficial organization, has spawned exchanges involving members of the respective business communities, women’s associations, youth organizations, parliamentarians, and regional government officials. In addition, the two countries have trade and air links. The politically powerful Armenian diaspora, or people living away from their homeland, number between four and five million. The diaspora is one of the primary factors preventing the two governments from further improvements in bilateral relations that would lead to normalization.

Syria

Soon after founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Turkish relations with Syria became tense and remained that way for many decades. The two countries came close to war on several occasions. The issues of contention include territory, identity, ideology, water, the Kurds, and Israel. Since 1998, however, relations have undergone a complete turnaround. Yet lingering uncertainty stems from Washington’s ongoing hostility to Syria. In 2005, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch secularist, visited Damascus to meet with President Bashar al-Assad despite U.S. requests not to make the trip.

Iraq

During the 1990s, Turkey was the anchor in the U.S. containment of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The unanticipated consequences of removing him from power and disbanding his army left both Turkish policymakers and the Turkish public unsure of when border stability could be restored. Turkey’s interests in Iraq are fourfold: 1) preventing sectarian division of the country that would create an autonomous Kurdish region and generate enthusiasm on the part of Turkish Kurds for a similar level of autonomy; 2) protecting Iraq’s 2.2 million Turkmen minority, which vies for control of the oil fields of northern Iraq; 3) eliminating the PKK that has sought refuge in Iraq; 4) thwarting a fundamentalist Islamist government from coming to power.

In obtaining these objectives, Ankara has a number of tools at its disposal. Aside from military power, Turkey’s control of the 965.6 km (600 mi) pipeline that carries oil from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, affords it substantial economic leverage. Alternatively, a buffer zone could be established between the two countries. The fact that Ankara does not, and has never, recognized the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) complicates communication. It declines to meet with its representatives in any official capacity.

Iran

While ties between the theocratic republic and its secular Turkish counterpart have never been close, diplomats representing both governments are quick to point out there has been virtually no serious armed conflict between the two nations for centuries. The delicate balance of power, which has maintained the peace, could be jeopardized if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons.

Yet, that is not the only consideration from Ankara’s perspective. Iran has become a source of oil and gas for Turkey, second only to Russia. To finance these energy purchases, Turkey needs to maintain its current level of exports to its largest neighbor. In this regard, Ankara views Washington’s policies as radicalizing and further isolating Tehran and unlikely to produce results that serve Turkey’s interests. Instead, Ankara has opted for engagement. To this end, Turkey has added Iran to the list of countries whose nationals can visit visa free. Iranian visitors now number a half million per year.

The two governments are strategic competitors for influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The dismantling of the USSR created a power vacuum which both governments have sought to fill by promoting their own respective forms of government, as well as exploiting common ethno-linguistic ties. While competition exists, neither Turkey nor Iran has developed the type of influence that would serve as a counterweight to that of Russia. At stake, of course, is the control of energy resources.

Azerbaijan

Turkey’s most important relationship in the Caucasus is with Azerbaijan. Despite Azerbaijan’s Shi’ite majority, the two countries share a strong linguistic and cultural history. Yet the heart of their present-day relationship is economic. Turkish businesses have invested over USD 1.5 billion, mainly in conjunction with Western investments related to energy resources. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline links the two countries through Georgia. It provides Baku a means to market its oil outside of Russian control and Turkey the opportunity to earn transit fees. Turkish entrepreneurs are highly visible in Azerbaijan, as are Turkish products in the Azeri marketplace.

Georgia

After Georgia declared independence in 1991, Turkey immediately established diplomatic relations with the new government. A regional security agreement between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 2002 included a provision that Turkey would provide assistance to modernize the Marneuli airbase near the capital of Tbilisi. Turkey has also provided assistance in developing Georgia’s United Military Academy. Yet Ankara remains wary of forging closer security ties for fear of alienating Moscow, which does not wish to see Georgia join NATO. Bilateral trade and investment remain modest in comparison to that with Azerbaijan.

Bulgaria

Throughout most of the 20th century, bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria focused on the rights of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria to retain their separate identity. This group comprises approximately 10% of Bulgaria’s population. Increasingly severe repression during the 1980s prompted 320,000 Turks to flee back to their homeland, overwhelming Turkey’s ability to assist them. This prompted a diplomatic crisis that contributed to the fall of Bulgaria’s communist government. After elections were implemented in the 1990s, a Muslim party representing the interests of Turks in a Christian land has competed at the ballot box. Since then, relations have shifted in focus to emphasize economic cooperation. The low standard of living in Bulgaria is a reason for the continuing exodus of ethnic Turks to Turkey.

Greece

Relations between Turkey and Greece have improved in the 21st century as a result of Athens’ decision not to oppose Turkey’s candidacy for full membership in the EU in 1999. The sticking point remains the unresolved issue of Cyprus. Cyprus is inhabited by a Greek majority and a Turkish minority, which constitutes 20% of the population. The issue dates back to 1974, when the Greek majority expressed its desire to unify with Greece. This prompted Turkish troops to occupy the northeastern part of the island to protect this Turkish minority. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared its independence, though to date it has only been recognized by Ankara.

Cyprus is de facto partitioned into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south. Years of negotiations, including two UN-sponsored referendums held in 2004 on which the Turk and Greek Cypriots voted different ways, have failed to resolve a stalemate. An UN-administered buffer zone with six cross points separates the two sides. In March 2008 the Turkish government reiterated its commitment to keep troops on Cyprus “until a just and permanent peace is established there.”